

Increased Enforcement and Higher Penalties Under the MINER Act: Do They Improve Worker Safety?

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Synopsis

§ 10.01.	Introduction.....	302
§ 10.02.	Safety Climate Prior to 2006 and the Events of 2006 and 2007	303
	[1] — 2005 Was a Record Safety Year for the Mining Industry	303
	[2] — The Events of 2006	303
	[a] — The Sago Mine Disaster	304
	[b] — Aracoma's Alma Mine No. 1	304
	[c] — The Darby Mine Explosion	304
	[3] — Congressional Response — The MINER Act	305
	[4] — 2007 and the Crandall Canyon Mine Collapse	306
§ 10.03.	MSHA's Response to the Increase in Underground Coal Fatalities and the MINER Act	307
	[1] — Procedure Instruction Letter No. 106-111-04	307
	[2] — MSHA Led the Changes to the Penalty Regulations.....	308
	[3] — The Use of Pattern of Violations	309
	[4] — An Increase in the Number of Inspectors and Inspection Hours.....	311
§ 10.04.	Today's Enforcement Climate in the Wake of the MINER Act.....	315
	[1] — Enforcement Paper Tops 100,000 in the Coal Industry Alone	315
	[2] — Assessments Have Far Exceeded the Increases in the Number of Violations	317
	[3] — Increase in Elevated Enforcement Actions.....	318
	[4] — Impact of the Federal Mine Safety Health and Review Commission.....	320
§ 10.05.	Impact on Fatality and Injury Rates.....	320
	[1] — Fatality Rates	320
	[2] — Non Fatal Days Lost Rates	322

[3] — All Injury Rates.....325
 § 10.06 Conclusion.....326

§ 10.01. Introduction.

Prior to 2006, the mining industry in the United States enjoyed some of its safest years, reflecting a marked increase in the industry-wide promotion of safe practices and a steady decrease in the number of coal-related fatalities. It was widely believed in industry circles that the decrease in coal-related fatalities spoke to the successes of recent advancements in mine safety technology and training, as well as the increased level of cooperation between the mining industry and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).

However, in the infant days of 2006, an unprecedented series of mine catastrophes brought national attention to an industry largely taken for granted, and simultaneously called into question the efficacy of underground mine safety. Early in 2006, the nation was rocked by a series of mine disasters that claimed the lives of 19 underground miners over the course of five months, a prelude to a total number of coal related fatalities in a single year that had not been seen in a decade.

The response of Congress, and more importantly MSHA, was to increase penalties under the guise of reinforcing mine safety standards and regaining control of an industry that was now viewed by the general public as unsafe and equally unregulated. Despite the breadth and scope of these “remedial” actions taken by Congress and MSHA to combat a perceived state of emergency in the mining industry that had emerged overnight, any correlation between resulting advancements or improvements in underground mine safety and the developing penalty driven culture fostered by MSHA may be tenuous at best and, at worst, nonexistent.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the unprecedented climate change in the mining industry in the wake of 2006, the “remedial” steps taken by Congress and MSHA, and what impact — if any — these changes have had on key safety rates used to gauge mine safety.